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664 OLSON tI. BIOLA CooP. RAISIN GaoWER.CI ASSN. [33 C.2d 
[So F. No. 17401. In Bank. Mar. 23,IM9.] 
A. J.OLSON ct at, Respondents, v. BIOLA COOPERA-
TIVE RAISIN GROWERS ASSOCIATION (a Corpo-
ration) et aI., Appellants. 
[1] Markets-Marketing Contracts-Liquidated Damages. -AJn'. 
Code, § 1209, authorizin~ a coopcrntivc mllrkl'ting association 
to fix by contrl1ct or by-laws the liquidated damagcs to be paid 
on a breach of contract, limits that power to thc 5.'\le, dolivery 
or withholdin~ of products that may bc the ;,;ubject of thll con-
tract, so that any undertaking by the associntion to go beyond 
those stated limits must fall within the provisions of Civ. Code, 
II 1670, 1671, which permit the recovery of liquidated damp-ges 
only where it would be impractical or extrl'm(:ly difficult to fix 
the actual damav:es. 
[2] Id.-Marketing Contracts-Liquida.tell Damages. - Independ-
ently of statute, a cooperative murketin~ association mny con-
tract for th,. pllymnnt by Ii mcmht·r of Il stipulntcd sum for t!le 
violl\tion of his ar.-rt'eml·nt tl' deliver aZl of his product to the 
association for prncesRinl!' and marbti~. 
[3] Id.-Marketing Contra.cts-Liquidated Damages.-Where the 
members of a cOOlmrative raisin growers' association delivered 
all of their rai."in~ to the association's pnckin~ house, and the 
raisins were acccpt(.'Ci by the packcr, there w:\s 11 completpd 
sale, and no liquidated damages could be rcoove!"cd under Agr. 
Code, § 1209, because some of the raisins contained excess 
moisture. 
[4] Id.-Marketing Contracts-Liquidated Damages.-Th,. ICl--is-
lative policy in enacting Agr. Code, I 120:1, with regard to 
liquidated damages to protect tho int(·).-ri.ty of a cooperative 
marketiDg· 8.ssOOiation;-iiiqiU:K.'Ci on the· tjUllnmy, not the qualify, 
feature of the memben' delivery of the promised products to 
the association. 
[5] Id.~:Marketing· Contracts - Liquidated Damages. - In A~. 
Code, I 1209, relating to liquidated damngfls for the breach of 
"any provision of the marketing contract regarlling' the snle or 
delivery or withholding of products," the word "delivery" em-
[1] See 8 CaLJur. 844; 16 Cal.Jur. 899; 15 Am.Jur. 671; 35 
Am.3ur. 169. 
[2] Cooperative marketi~ of farm products by producen' as-
sociations, notes, 2.1) A.L.R. 1113; 33 A.L.R. 247; 47 A.L.R. 936; 
77 A.L.R. 405; 9R A.L.R. 1406. See, also, 16 Cal.3ur. t!94; 35 
Am.3ur. 153. 
IIIcX. Dil. Reference: [1-6) Markets, § 12(5). 
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braces an agency relationship in contrast to a "sale," Ilnd dol's 
not connote "time, place, manner, object, quantity and quality," 
so as to embrace a contract of a grower to deliver his raisins 
"properly cured and in good condition." 
[6] Id.-Marketing Contracts-Liquidated Damages.-The mem-
bers of a cooperative raisin growers' association who sold 
raisins whieh contained excess moisture were not liable under 
a marketing a",o-reement for liquidated damages where the 
entire agreement, construed in the light of the circumstanc('s 
under which it was made, manifested an intent to provide for 
the recovery of liquidated damages only when a member failed 
or refused to deliver all his raisins to the association. (Civ. 
Code, §§ 1636, 1641.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno 
County. Ernest Klette, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to recover liquidated damages for delivery of sub-
standard raisins under a marketing agreement. Judgment for 
plaintiffs reversed. 
Chester R. Andrews, William C. Crossland, Lawrence W. 
Young and Milo Popovich for Appellants. 
Irvine P. Atten, Aynesworth & Hayhurst, G. I. Aynesworth 
and L. Nelson Hayhurst for Respondents. 
SPENCE, J .-Following the granting of a rehearin~, 
further consideration of the issues presented on this appeal 
leads to the conclusion that our former opinion correctly 
disposed of such issues, and said opinion is therefore adopted 
as follows: I 
Biola Cooperative Raisin Growers Association was organized 
as a nonprofit cooperative marketing association under the 
laws of the state of California. Plaintiffs-four members of 
the association-brought this action, a representative suit, 
against thc association and the other sixteen members thereof, 
including the five directors, to re('over liquidated dama~('s 
alleged to be due by virtue of the delivery of raisins deemed to 
be substandard under the provisions of the marketing agree-
ment between the association and its various members. Eight 
of the individually named uefendunts were found to be so 
liable in conformity with the theory of plaintiffs' complaint, 
and judgment accordingly was entered against them in varying 
amounts computed upon the basis of their substandard tonnage 
) 
) 
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delivery to the association, the total sum being $19,856.79, 
plus interest, and costs. These defendants have appealed from 
such judgment, urging, as a principal ground for reversal, 
that liquidated damages were not properly assessable against 
them under the record in this case. Consideration of the 
language of the marketing agreement and the statutory regu-
lations governing the disposition of such damage claim as is 
hrre made demonstrates the merit of defendants' argument 
distinguishing their default as one in quality rather than in 
quantity of crop delivery. 
The record reveals that on October 20, 1944, plaintiff Chris 
H. Scheidt, "a grower member of the . . . Association," 
entered into an agreement with tlle association whereby he 
undertook to process and pack the "raisin crop" of the 
association "for the year 1944" for a specified sum per ton. 
He rented the association's packing house for the season, and 
the association '8 members were obligated to deliver their 
raisins there "properly cured and in good condition" under 
the terms of their marketing agreement with the association. 
Delivery of the raisins to Scheidt at the packing house com-
menced soon after the date of the packing agreement and was 
concluded early in 1945. Although the association was em-
powered under the marketing agreement to set up quality 
standards regarding "sugar and moisture content" to "be 
met by all raisins delivered by the Grower [s]," it had not 
done so. However, it appears that 55 per cent of the raisin 
crop in question was under contract for sale to the United 
Statel! Government, and the federal regulations, introduced 
in evidence, permitted a moisture content of "not more than 
18 per cent." Gauged by this standard, there was substantial 
evidence that some of the raisins delivered by the eight grower 
merubcrs of thc nssociation against whom judgment was 
rendered had a higher moisture content so that they could 
1I0t be rnn through the stemmer and processed without further 
drying. Finding that such raisins "were not properly dried 
A nd cured but were too wet and contained too much moisture 
,md were too heavy for processing and marketing," the trial 
('ourt determined the exact weight of the defective delivery 
made by each of the eight defaulting growers and accordingly 
proportioned against them plaintiffs' recovery of liquidated 
damages. 
All of the members' raisins, both wet and dry, were de-
livered at the packing house, which was under the control of 
plaintiff Chris H. Scheidt. He received them, knowing at th,· 
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;;:~e of delhet·y or shortly t,ht'ft'after thut !;Olll,t' \)f I hem wrro 
wet. He did report that fact to the officers of the association 
but the wet raisins were neither rejected nor returned, and 
both he and the association continued to permit the delivery 
and acceptance of wet raisins, all of which were ultimately 
sold. Some of the growers who had delivered wet raisins 
offered to remove them from the packing house and properly 
cure them at their own expense, but they were not permitted 
to do so. However, it appears that under the government 
regulations, all of the raisins--both wet and dry-were sold 
for $180 per ton and each grower received an additional $10 
per ton as an "incentive payment" or reward for drying his 
grapes instead of selling them fresh, so that no one suffered any 
loss by reason of the delivery of wet raisins. 
With these basic factual considerations at hand, the de-
terminative issue is whether plafntiffs, as representative mem-
bers of the association, may enforce the collection of liquidated 
damages for the default in question, premised solely upon 
the allpgation that after demand, the directors failed to act 
because three of them, a majority of the board. were interested 
parties, having themselves delivered wet raisins to the packing 
house. The answer to this problem lies in an analysis of cer-
tain provisions of the association's marketing agreement 
with its members, in the light of applicable language in the 
Agricultural Code bearing upon the exception of cooperative 
marketing associations from the rules governing the enforce-
ment of liquidated damage claims under the general law of 
this state as expressed in sections 1670 and 1671 of the 
Civil Code. 
Section 1 of the marketing agreement reads: "The Associa-
tion buys and the Grower sells to the Association annually 
from the date of the signing of the By-Laws of the Associa-
tion and this agreement all of the raisins owned and grown 
by the Grower, and agrees to deliver the same and all thereof 
properly cured and in good condition to the plant of the 
Association." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 7 of the agreement contains the following stipUla-
tion: ,« In the event that Grower should fail to deliver raisins 
hereby sold in accordance with terms of this agreement and 
these By-Laws, such act will injure the Association to an 
amonnt that is, and will be impracticable and extremely diffi-
cult to determine and fix, and that is, therefore, fixed at the 
amonnt of Twenty-five (25%) per cent of the average current 
.~easonal price for each and every ton 0/ ,.aisim 11uJI fhe 
) 
) 
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Grower lails 10 a,liver in accordance with the terms hereof 
andthe.se By-Laws, and which amount the Growf'.r agrees 
to pay, and shall pay, to the Association upon demand . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
And section 13 of the agreement states in part: "It is 
expressly understood and agreed that Grower has by this 
agreement agreed to and wiLl deliver Ihe raisim herein con-
tracted to be delitJered to the Association, or in lieu thereof 
to pay liquidated damage. therefor as by this agreement pro-
vided for his failure so to do. . . ." (Emphasis added,) 
Section 1209 of the Agricultural Code provides: •• The 
by-laws or the' marketing contract may fix, as liquidated dam-
ages, specific sums to be paid by the member or stockholder 
to the association upon the breach by him of any provision 
of the marketing contract regarding the .ale or delitJery or 
withholding of products; . . . and such clauses providing 
for liquidated damages shall be enforceable as 'SUch and shall 
not be regarded as penalties." (Emphasis added.) And the 
first paragraph of section 1213 of said code states: "Any 
provisions of law which are in conflict with this chapter shall 
not be construed as applying to the associations herein pro-
vided for." 
[1] The general rule in this state is that a contract which 
undertakes to fix the amount of damages in anticipation of a 
breach of an obligation is void to that extent (Cjv. Code, 
§ 1670) except "when, from the nature of the ease, it would be 
impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." 
(Civ. Code, § 1671.) Accordingly, it is beld that a party 
relying on a liquidated damage clause in a contract must plead 
and prove the facts validating his right to recover such pre-
determined amo1lllt. (Dyer Bro.. Golden Wesl Iron Works 
v. Central Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 593 [189 P. 445] ; Robert 
"tarsh ~ Co., Inc. v. Tremper, 210 Cal. 572, 576 [292 P. 950] ; 
lUee v. Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385 [115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R. 
589] ; Kekic'h, v. Blum, 43 Cal.App.2d 525, 527-528 [111 P.2d 
411].) 
However, an important exception to the general rule on the 
remedy of liquidated damages prevails in the case of a non-
profit cooperative marketing association, as declared by section 
1209 of the Agricultural Code above quoted. This exception 
permits such an association and its members to stipulate in 
advance the amount of damages to be paid upon the breach 
of an obligation in the parti(,1l1ars of "the sale or delivery or 
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ment. While such statutory language constitutes a grant of 
power, that power is confined to the three sl1bj~cts specifically 
mentioned flO that any undertaking on the part of the associa· 
tion to go beyond those stated hmits must fall within the pro· 
visions of sections 1670 and 1671 of the Civil Code, which, a<:! 
heretofore noted, permit the recovery uf liquidat.ed damages 
only where it would be m.praeticable or extremely difficult to 
etItimate actual damages-:-a matter of pleading and proof 
resting on t.he party seeking su<!h redress. 
[2] Even in the absence of statut.e· it was welJ established 
in this state that a nonprofit cooperative marketing associa-
tio)J mjght <.'ontract for the payment by a member of R fltipU' 
ltited sum tor the violation of his agreement 00 deliver all of 
bis product to the association for processing and marketing. 
(Anilheim Citrus Fruit AlSociation v. Yeoman, 51 Cal.App. 
759, ,64 [197 P. 959]; Poult,.y p,.oduce,.s of Cent,.al Califo,.. 
nia, Inc. v. Murphy, 64 Cal.App. 450, 455 [221 P. 962] : Cali-
fornia Canning Peach Growers v. Downey, 76 CaJ.App. 1, 
11·12 [243 P. 679]; California Canning Peach Growers v. 
Harri.'t. 91 Cal.App. 654, 655 [267 P. 572] : see, also, Poult,.y 
Producers of Southern California, Inc. v. Ba,.low, 189 Cal. 
278, 280·281 [208 P. 93] ; California Bean Growers' Associa-
tion v. Rindge Land (fNa11igation Co., 199 Cal. 168, 183 
[248 P. 658, 47 A.L.R. 904].) The validity of such a liquidated 
damage provision stemmed from the principle that the whole 
business scheme of the marketing association necessarily 
depended upon its ability to hold and control the subject 
matter of its operations, a consideration demonstrating the 
disrupting effect which a member's failure to deliver all of 
his product to the association would have on its successful 
functioning and the consequent elements of damage which 
would not be capable of any exact estimation. As was so aptly 
stated with regard to such breach in delivery to the citrus 
fruit cooperative involved in the Anaheim case, supra, at 
pages 763-764: "The existence and life of the association itself 
depended upon its being furnished fruit to dispose· of in the 
public market. A reduction in the amount of fruit so handled 
\vould not only tend to increase the overhead cost to the non-
transgressing members, but, we may assume, to some extent 
A lieet the prestige and standing of the association as a market-
ing concern; The argument would be the same, regardless of 
the quantity of fruit which might have been delivered by the 
defendant, whether it composed but a small fractional part 
or one·half or more of the entire product designed to be mar-
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keted by the plaintiff agency [the association]. Enough has 
been said, we think, to show that the case falls within the 
class as to which the law permits damages to be liquidated by 
contract in advance of their occurrence [Civ. Code, § 1671]. 
It follows as a necessary conclusion that plaintiff was entitled 
to recover the exact amount fixed in its contract as the sum per 
box which defendant should pay by reason of his failure to 
market [his] fruit in the manner agreed." The same line of 
reasoning was followed in Irwindale Citrus Assn. v. Semler, 
60 Cal.App.2d 318, 323 [140 P.2d 716]. 
But all of these cases involved the quantity of the product 
contracted for delivery to the marketing association and the 
significance of a member's breach in that respect, 80 that a 
part of his product was released for distribution through other 
channels in competition with the cooperative enterprise and 
to the detriment of all the members thereof. The quality of 
the fruit delivered was not an issue and was not considered. 
The same distinguishing observations apply with respeet to 
delivery breaches discussed in similar cases from other juris-
dictions. (See 25 A.L.R. 1113; supplement.ed in 33 A.L.R. 
247; 47 A.L.R. 936; 77 A.L.R. 405; 98 A.L.R. 1406.) In the 
instant case the quantity of the raisins delivered is not a point 
of dispute, as it is admitted that the members delivered all of 
their raisins to the Association for marketing. Rather here 
it is the quality of the raisins that is at issue, so that the pres-
ent problem transcends the scope of the decided cases. How-
ever, they are significant because of their discussion of the 
economic considerations which tend to indicate the design of 
the statntory law expressive of the legislative policy with 
regard to the availability of liquidated damages in protecting 
the integrity of a booperative marketing association. 
[3] Pursuant to these preliminary remarks, there is to be 
considered at the outset whether or not the grower membern 
of the association who delivered wet raisins to the packing 
house violated their marketing agreement in any of the par-
ticulars specified in section 1209 of the Agricultural Code-
that is, in regard to "the sale or delivery or withholding of 
products," as those terms are used in said section. Section 1 
of the marketing agreement contemplates a sale of the raisins 
by the grower to the Association when it provides that "the 
Association buys and the Grower sells to the Association . . ." 
his crop of raisins-a saJe with fut.ure delivery. This brings 
into operation the provision of section 1208 of the Agricultnral 
Code that if a contract of sale is made, "it shall be conclu-
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~t\d~' "dJ tt.:I} tif.lt~ 10 til" pnHhwts pa"S\'S ;~bsoiliteh , ... ! 
unreservedly, mwept for rpl~CJl'dctl lil'IIS, t.o the assoeiallllil 
upon delivery." So here a sale of the raisins occurred and was 
completed upon delivery to, and acceptance by, the association 
and the pacl,er Scheidt. In contrast to such "sale" arrange-
ment as here prevails, cooperative marketing agreements fre-
quently provide for an agency relationship, under which the 
grower agrees to deliver his crop to the association and 
appoints the association his agent to handle and market the 
crop for him and to return the net proceeds to him-a mere 
"delivery" arrangement whereby title to the crop does not 
pass to the association. But the equal importance of faithful 
performance of either type of obligation is expressly recog-
nized in section 1209 in the specific mention of "sale or deliv-
ery ... of products." The third reference in section 1209, 
the" withholding of products," would appear to apply to any 
act of the grower in holding back from the association any 
part of the crop which he has either sold or is otherwise bound 
to deliver to the association for marketing. As each grower 
member admittedly turned over all his raisins to the associa-
tion, and therefore made no default in performance with 
respect to quantity, we are of the opinion, for the reasons 
hereinafter stated, that a proper construction of the provi-
sions of said section 1209 leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs 
failed to show a breach of any of the three conditions enumer-
ated as the premise for the recovery of liquidated damages. 
[4] The above view of the qualifying language of section 
1209 of the Agricultural Code follows the theory that the right 
to delivery of its members' products is the most important 
right of a cooperative marketing association, a matter that was 
forcefully adjudicated in this state in the Anaheim and suc-
ceeding cases above cited, and which principle of judicial 
decision presumably governed the Legislature's correlative 
statutory action on the subject. (23 Cal.Jur. 783, § 159.) It was 
the quantity, not the quality, feature of the members' delivery 
that was considered the lifeblood of the cooperative and essen-
tial to the maintenance of its place in the competitive market. 
That such was the Legislature's concept of the need for 
liquidated damages as a protective measure for cooperatives 
appears from other related sections of the Agricultural Code. 
Thus section 1210 provides that "In the event of any suck 
breach or threatened breach of such marketing contract by a 
member, the association shall be entitled to an injunction to 
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specific performance thereof. " (Emphasis added.) In so 
making the remedies of injunction and specific performance 
available to a cooperative marketing association on the same 
basis as the remedy of liquidated damages-that is, for the 
type of breach mentioned in section 1209, one "regarding 
the sale or delivery or withholding of products"-the Legis-
lature must have intended such judicial enforcement with 
rl:'lation to the members' promised delivery in quantity rather 
than to have the court undertake detailed supervisory meas-
IIres to insure delivery not merely as to amount but likewise 
as to the quality of the product, depending on the performance 
of various farming operations which would yield the desired 
standard. Likewise section 1211 provides that" In any action 
upon· such marketing agreements. it shall be c(lnclusively pre· 
sumed that a landowner or landlord or lessor is able to control 
the delivery of products produced on his land by tenants or 
others, . . .; and in such actions, the foregoing remedies for 
Ilondelivery or breach shall lie and be enforceable against such 
landowner, landlord or lessor." (Emphasis added.) In so 
recognizing that a grower might attempt to evade his obli-
),ration as to delivery under the marketing agreement by leasing 
his land to another, thus supposedly divesting himself of 
control over the crop, and in rendering such device ineffectual, . 
the Legislature again evinced its intent that the matter of 
delivery within the landowner's control would be the quantity, 
not the quahty dependent on various practices of husbandry 
that might prevail on the farm. In other words, these provi· 
sions all point to the f}lndamental tenet of exclusive dealing 
between such association and its members, in the sense of full 
delivery of the promised product, as the limit of legislative 
concern, and not the added consideration of varian<.'e in the 
condition of the product delivered with the involvement of 
multiple details as to farming operations. 
[6] While plaintiffs do not cite any section of the Agri. 
cultural Code that specifically permits contracting for the 
recovery of liquidated damages for breach of an agreement 
as to the quality of the product to be delivered, they claim 
that such would be within the scope of the reference in section 
1209 to "any provision of the marketing contract regarding 
the sale or delivery or withholding of products." In pursuance 
of this position, plaintiffs argue that in section 1 of the 
marketing agreement each grower contracted to deliver his 
raisins "properly cured and in good condition," and that 
this covenant was breached by the delivery of wet raisins; 
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that in section 7 each grower agreed to pay the liquidated 
damages if he failed to deliver his raisins "in accordance 
with the terms of this agreement"; that this covenant W!HI 
broken by the delivery of wet raisins which were neither 
., properly cured" nor ,. in good condition"; that therE.'upon 
the agreement to pay liquidated damages came into E.'tYect 
and could be enforced within the intent of the "omnibus 
provisions" of section 1209. They also argue that under the 
quoted language of section 1213 of the Agricultural Code, 
the provisions of section 1670 and 1671 of the Civil Code 
have no application in this case. But to construE.' section 
1209 as an "omnibus" provision would in effect eliminate 
any premise of limitation consistent with the three particulars 
mentioned as the basis for the contracting for liquidated 
damages and would allow ~lUch remedy for the breach of 
"any provision of thE.' marketing contract," without qualifica-
tion. However, the statute does qualify the availability of 
the remedy and, as above construed. it refers to "delivery" 
as embracing an agency relationship in contrast to a "sale," 
as here prevails. Accordingly, the word "delivery" cannot 
be said to connote there, as plaintiffs contend, "time, place, 
manner, object, quantity and quality"-an • 'omnibus " con-
cept which would far exceed the idea of the fact of delivery 
of the promised amount as a measure of assurance to the 
cooperative marketing association that its whole scheme of 
organization would not be nullified by some of the product 
of its members reaching the public market through outside 
competitive channels, to its disadvantage and. perhaps, to 
its ultimate break-up. Since upon the record plaintiffs' claim 
involves the qu~lity, not the quantity, of raisins delivered, 
the provisions of sections 1670 and 1671 are not in conflict 
with the provisions of the Agricultural Code insofar as the 
facts of this case are concerned, and section 1213 of the latter 
code does not aid their position. 
[6] Moreover, a study of the entire marketing agreement 
leads to the conclusion that it was the intention of the con-
tracting parties to provide for the recovery of liquidated 
damages only when a grower member failed or refused to 
deliver all his raisins to the Association. Such overall examin-
ation accords with the fundamental rule that the determina-
tion of the meaning of a contract depends. in each case, 
upon thE' intent of the parties as evidenced by the entire 
agreement construed in the light of the circumstances under 
III r:.2<1-22 
) 
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'.dUd! it wus 1II:t1It-'.(Ch·. Code, §§ 16:lli, Hi41; Ogb·una v. 
j'ravelet·s In.'f,,.nmce 00., j()7 Cal. ,jll. ~j l:ri6 P. IOU41.) In 
other words, the" 'sense and lIl('aning of the parties to any 
particular instrument should be collected ex antecedental'us 
et consequentibtts; that is to say, every part of it should be 
brought into action, in order to collect from the whole one 
uniform and consistent sense, if that may be done.''' (Bal-
fout' v. Fresno Canal ct Irrigation Co., 109 Cal. 221, 227 
141 P. 8761.) 
So pertinent are these considerations of language in the 
parties' marketing agreement. Section 13 appears to be a 
slIJDmary of the prior provision on the subject of liquidated 
damages. It conditions the agreement to pay such sum upon 
the fact of failure to deliver. Likewise section 7, containing 
the agreed terms- for the liquidated damages, suggests that 
it was intended to apply upon failure to deliver the full 
amount of the product, and not upon failure in the quality 
of the product. In addition to other provisions, the section 
('x pressly states that it would be "impracticable and extremely 
difficult to determine and fix" the damages "in the event 
t hat Grower should fail to deliver raisins hereby sold in 
accordance with the terms of this agreement," and accord-
ingly, the damage liability is related directly to the circum-
stance of default in the promised tonnage of raisins. It' has 
been held that such declaration is a true statement of a fact 
in the case of the failure to deliver to a cooperative marketing 
association, as the subject has been exhaustively discussed in 
the above-noted decisions in this and other jurisdictions. But 
the same result does not I?revail in the case-of the delivery ''Of 
substandard raisins for the reason that raisins are graded, and 
each 'grade has an ascertainable market value which may vary 
from season to season and from time to time. Raisins not 
properly cured, of course, have a less market value than 
those properly cured. The loss from a violation of the con-
tract specification as to quality may be ascertained and deter~ 
mined under the ordinary rules of the law of damages. (Rice 
v. Schmid, supra, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385-386.) That the parties 
had such principle in mind for the assessment of damages in 
the event of delivery of a substandard lot of raisins appears 
from their failure to provide in their agreement a variable 
pecuniary standard, according to the degree of default, for 
the computation of liquidated damages rather than a fiat 
rate which might be far in excess of the actual damages sus-
tained where the default in quality was slight, and the re-
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sultant damage obligation would partake of the nature of a 
pena tty, contrary to "the effort of the law" to "work [an 1 
equitable result" in casting "upon the delinquent party a 
liability to respond to" a reasonable asspssment of damages. 
(Anaheim Citrus Fruit Association v. Yeoman, supra, 51 
Cal.App. 759, 761; Mente & Co., Inc. v. Fresno Compresli 
& Warehouse Co., 113 Cal.App. 325, 330-331 [298 P. 126].) 
Likewise the flat rate of liquidated damages provided in tht' 
marketing agreement might be wholly inadequate if the fruit 
deli vcred was greatly below the promised standard or the 
nature of the defect was such that the substandard lot might 
contaminate the other lots of raisins of the association with 
which it was mixed, and so cause a very substantial loss, which 
the parties could not have reasonably anticipated in pre-
dt'termining the damage liability as a "fair compensation for 
the loss sustained." (Rice v. Schmid, supra, 18 Ca1.2d 382, 
386.) 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, plaintiffs' position 
on this appeal cannot be sustained. The provisions of the 
Agricultural Code do not authorize a contract for the re-
covery of liquidated damages because of the inferior quality 
of the product delivered to and accepted by a nonprofit 
cooperative marketing association; and an analysis of the 
particular marketing agreement here in question aoes not 
!'.how such damage liability to have been within the contempla-
tion of the parties. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J .. and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J .-1 dissent. I disagree with the position taken 
by the majority in this caSe. That position is not only not 
in accord with the various statutory provisions involved. but 
in effect holds that this court will not enforce the terms of 
a contract, which is not illegal or in contravention of public 
policy, and which was made by parties capable of contracting. 
It seems quite apparent to me that the result reached in 
the majority opinion is achieved by ignoring the facts in-
\'olved and concentrating on the unexpressed thought that 
to do otherwise would be to come to a harsh result. It also 
seems quite apparent to me that if I contract to buy a horse 
wil h four sound legs and I am ~old ont' with only three legs 
I should be able to pnforce my contract. However, I may 
be assuming too much-as the three-legged horse might be 
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able to walk, and the majority of this court would therefore . 
hold that I got all that I bargained for. 
Biola Cooperative Raisin Growers Association . was organ-
ized as a nonprofit cooperative marketing association under 
the laws of the State of California. Plaintiffs, four members 
of the Association, brought this action, a representative suit, 
against the association and the other 16 members thereof, 
including the five directors, to recover liquidated damagps 
alleged to be due by virtue of the delivery of raisins of sub-
standard quality under the provisions of the marketing agree-
ment between the Association and its various members. Eight 
of the individually named defendants were found to be so 
liable in conformity with the theory of plaintiffs' complaint, 
and judgment was accordingly entered against them in vary-
ing amounts computed on the basis of their tonnage delivery 
of raisins of defective quality. The total sum amounted to 
$19,856.79 plus interest and costs. These defendants have 
appealed, eontending that liquidated damages were not prop-
erly assessed against them for several reasons hereinafter 
stated. 
On October 20, 1944, plaintiff Chris H. Scheidt, a grower 
member of the association, entered into an agreement with 
the sssociation whereby he undertook to process and pack 
the raisin crop of the association for the year 1944 for a 
specified sum per ton. He rented the association's packing 
house for the season, and the association's members agreed, 
in writing, to deliver their raisins there "properly cured and 
in good condition." The contract provided further that he 
would "perform said packing operations according to the 
instructions of the Association and the specifications provided 
by the government in packing same." The pertinent provi-
sions of the marketing agreement entered into by all grower 
members in 1941 with the association are as follows: 
"Section 1: The Association buys and the Grower sells to 
the Association annually from the date of the signing of the 
By-Laws of the Association and this agreement all of the 
raisins owned and grown by the Grower, and agrees to de-
liver the same and all thereof properly cured and in {JoQ(l 
condition to the plant of the Association. . . ." 
"Section 5: The Association reserves the power to set 
standards of maturity, quality, sugar, and moisture ('on tent, 
whieh must be met by all raisins delivered by the Grower ...• 
"Section 7: In the event that Grower should fail to tfe-
liver raisins hereby sold in accordance with the terms of this 
) 
Mar. 1949] OLSON v. nTOt,A COOf'. RAT~[N GROWERS ASSN. 677 
[33 C.2d 66(; 204 P.2d 101 
agreement and these By-Laws, such act will injure the Asso-
ciation to an amonnt that is, and will be impracticable and 
extremely difficult to determine and fix, and that is, therefore, 
thed at the amount of Twenty-Five (25%) percent of the 
average current seasonal price for each and every ton of 
raisins that the Grower fai18 to deliver in accordance with 
the terms hereof and· these By-Laws, and which amount the 
Grower agrees to pay, and shall pay, to the Association upon 
demand, ... 
"Section 13: It is expressly understood and agreed that 
Grower hRS by this agreement agreed to and will deliver the 
raisins herein contracted to be delivered to . the Association, 
or in lieu thereof to pay liquidated damages therefor as by 
this agreement provided for his failure so to do, . . . 
"Section 14: It is further understood and agreed that 
should any controversy arise between the Association and the 
Grower pertaining to the quality or quantity of any raisiJllll 
dnlivered, or to be delivered hereunder, and an agreement 
cannot be reached blftween the parties, that the same shall be 
referred to a board I)f arbitration consisting of three parties, 
one designated by the Board of Directors of the Association, 
one by the Grower, and one by the two so designated, and 
their decision in regard thereto shall be final and binding 
upon both parties hereto." (Emphasis added.) 
Shortly after t.he packing agreement with Chris B. Scheidt 
had been ent&ed into, the growers began delivery to him 
under the terms of their agreements with the association. 
The deliveries were concluded early in 1945. Although the 
association had reserved the power to set standards of ma-
turity, quality, sugar, and moisture content it had not done 
so. However, it appears that 55 per cent of the raisin crop 
in question was under contract for sale to the United States 
government, and the federal regulations, introduced in evi-
dence, permitted Ii moisture content of Unot more than 18 
per cent." 
In accordance with the marketing agreement, and upon 
the basis of the standard set by the government, arbitration 
proceedings were had on November 26, 1945, between the 
members of the association, with the exception of defendant 
J. H. Scheidt. The court ordered J. H. Scheidt to appoint 
an arbitrator within 30 days so that the arbitration with 
respect to the quality of his raisins could be disposed of, but 
Scheidt declined to do so, and consented to the court passing 
UpOA and determ.ining t!le quality of raisins delivered by him 
') 
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.. f !'.I. :/ .. ",,,·;,,1 iOIl. alll.l at thl' f l'ial iutrmluced evidellce U}JUlC 
tltitt j~ul'. Till' COIll·t coufirmeu the report of the arbitrators 
and found that, in accordance therewith, certain of the indi-
vidnal defendants, including J. H. Scheidt, had delivered 
raisins with excessive moisture content and the amount 
thereof. 
There is substantial evidence, as will be shown in some 
detail later in this opinion. that Rome portions of the raisins 
delivered by the eight grower members of the association 
against whom judgment was rendered were so high in moisture 
content that they could not be run through the stemmer and 
processed without further drying. Finding that such raisins 
"were not properly dried and cured but were too wet and 
contained too much moisture and were too heavy for process-
ing and marketing" the trial court determined the exact 
weight of the defective delivery made by each of the defaulting 
growers and accordingly proportioned against them plaintiffs' 
recovery of liquidated damages. 
Defendants contend that plaintiffs could not recover liqui-
dated damages without alleging and proving that aetnal 
damages would be "impractieable or extremely difficult to 
fix .. _" in accordance with the provisions of section 1670 
of the Civil Code. That this is the general rule in this state 
where there is a contract which undertakes to :fix the amount 
of damages in anticipation of an obligation has been so held 
in the following cases: Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385 
[115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R. 5891; Robert Marsh <f Co., Inc. v. 
Tremper, 210 Cal. 572, 576 {292 P. 9501: Dyer Bros Etc. 
1. Wk •. v. Central Iron W1ts, 182 Cal. 588 [189 P. 445]; 
Kekick v. Bl·um,43 Cal.App.2d 525 [111 P.2d 411]. But the 
Legislature has provided for an exception to this rule with 
respect to liquidated damages where 8 nonprofit eooperative 
marketing association is concerned. This exception, which 
is a grant of power to such cooperatives. is set forth in section 
1209 of the Agricultural Code: "The by-laws or the market-
ing contract may fix, as liquidated damages. specific sums to 
be paid by t.he memher or stockbo1c1er to the aRSociation upon 
the breach by him of any provision of the marketing eontrllct 
regarding the sale or delivery or withholding of products; 
... and any such· provisions shall be valid and enforceable 
in the courts of this State: and slwh "JallSE'lI providing for 
liqnidated damages slullI be enforceable 88 such and shall not 
be regarded as penalties." . 
) 
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The majority say that the alleged breach by defendants 
rlO(,8 not fall within the above section of the Agricultural Code 
in that the intention of the Legislature was to provide for:" 
nt'liveries deficient in quantity, rather than deliveries of 
produce of defective quality. 
In order to conclude that this contention has merit it is ' 
necessary to iv.nore cortain terms of the marketing agreement 
entered into by each defendant with the a.'ISOciation. It was 
there ~urreed that each ~rower Mould sell "all of the raisins 
owned and grown" by him, and that the grower "agrees to 
deliver the same and aU tk,weof properly et£red and in Good 
conditio·n." [Emphasis add~d.] 
Section 1208 of the Agricllltural Code provides iu pnrt 
that "If they contract a sale w the association, it shall be 
conclusively held that title to the products passes absolutely 
alul ulIre1iprvedly, e:-tcept for recorded liens, to tke association 
ulJOn delivery: or nt any othE'r specified time if expressly and 
definitely agreed in the said contract." (Emphasis added.) . 
Section 1725(3) of the Civil Code provides that: "Where 
the parties purport to effect a present sale of future goods, 
the agreement operates as a contract to sell the goods and as 
soon as the !:elJer acquires the goods the property therein 
shall pass to the buyer without further act if the parties so 
intend unless the agreement otherwi.~e provides." 
Section 1213 of the Agricultural Code provides that: " Any 
provisions of law \vhich are in confiict with this chapter shall 
not be construed as applying to the associations herein pro-
vided for." 
Construing thelie statutory provisions together with the 
marketing tlboreemcnt, which made no provision for the time 
title was to pass, if ",uofdd aPl'ear that Ike sale of the raisins 
WIl$ to take place ttpon delivery of tke raisins to tke Associa-
tion in accordance with· tke terms of tke contract, thus bring. 
ing the present ease ,vi thin the provisions of sectioIJ.. 1209 of 
the Agricultural Code. That section provides that liquidated 
damages mny be provided for upon the breach by a member 
"of any provision of the marketing contract regarding the 
sale . . . of products. . . ." 
Why the majority feel it necessary to discuss the practice 
of delivery of produce by the growcr to a cooperative nssoeia-
tion as agent for the sale of' that produce is not clear. That 
practice is not involved here. It is also not clear just why the 
facts of this case do not bring it within the provisions of the 
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sale of fruit in a certain condition. Further, aU applicable 
laws in existence at the time the contract is made become a 
part thereof as fully as if incorporated by reference. (Civ. 
Code, § 1656; 6 Cal.Jur. 311, § 186; Calpetro P. Syndicate v. 
C. M. WootU Co., 206 Cal. 246 [274 P. 651). The partIes 
then· intended, because it is so provided in the Agricultural 
Code, that title should pass when the fruit was delivered. 
This is the time the sale took place, not when the contract to 
sell was entered into. The contract was breached with respect 
to the quality of. the fruit which was to be delivered. AI I 
have previously pointed out, the Legislature has specifically 
provided that the parties. may contract for liquidated damages 
to be paid to the association upon any breach by a member 
regarding the sale of products. The parties did so contract 
and the breach occurred, but the majority of this court refuse 
to allow that contract to be enforced. I cannot agree with a 
result which ignores not only the intent of the parties as 
expressed in their contract, but which also ignores the clear 
provisions of the Agricultural Code. 
In the absence of statute in this state, it was well established 
that a nonprofit cooperative marketing association might con-
tract for the payment by a member of liquidated damages 
for the violation of his agreement to deliver his product- to 
the association for processing and marketing. (Oalifornia 
etc. Ass'n. v. Rindge L. ff N. 00., 199 Cal. 168 [248 P. 658,47 
A.L.R. 904] ; Poultry Producer, 0/ 80. Oal. v. Barlow, 189 
Cal. 278 [208 P. 93] ; Anaheim C. P. AI,'n. v. Yeoman, 51 
Cal.App. 759 [197 P. 959].) The validity of liquidated 
damage provisions in situations involving cooperatives was 
established because of the need on the part of these associa-
--tionstooontrol thequantio/ of the particular commodity 
involved. AI was said in the Anaheim case, decided before 
the enactment of the present code sections: •• The existence 
and life of the association itself depended· upon its being 
furnished fruit to dispose of in the public market. A reduc-
tion in the amount of fruit so handled would not only tend 
to increase the overhead cost to the non transgressing members, 
but, we may assume, to some extent dect the prestige and 
standing of the association as a marketing concern." (51 
Cal.App. 759, 763.) These words are equally applicable to a 
situation such as the one here uuder consideration. The 
quality of the produce to be marketed may be of vital im-
portance to the prest.ige of the association, and one does not 
need a vivid imagination to anticipate such situationa. In the 
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present case, the associat.iQn And itR melllbl'fS had agreed be· 
tween themselves +.hat fruit of a ccrtain quality should be 
delivered. The association had contracted with the govern-
ment:of the United States that fruit of 8 certain moisture 
contellt. should be packed and delivered. As a result of the 
derelictions of certain members, the association was unable 
to meet its government contracts and the raisins in question 
were sold, unprocessed, to others. That the association and 
the members considered the quality of the raisins important 
is evident from the termS of the marketing agreement. It is 
equally evident that the prestige and standing of a marketing 
association may suffer as well from not being able to meet 
its contracts because of the poor quality of the produce as 
from a deficiency in quantity. If" to be Mted Aere tAat the 
poor qualit71 of tAe raisifU prevented tAem from being packed 
and tAUI tAe result was precisely tAe same as if tAe de/av.lting 
growers Aad not delive,.ed all tAe raisins produced b71 tAem. 
That the unprocessed raisins were subsequently sold to others 
is immaterial with respect to the standing and prestige of 
the association. The fact remains that it, admittedly, could 
not meet its contracts with the government for processed 
raisins. It is thus apparent that the association was injured 
by the breach of the marketing contract. 
The defendants next contend that the words "properly 
cured and in good condition" were ambiguous; and that al-
though the raisins in question were delivered during the latter 
months of the year 1944, the chemical tests, showing the 
exces$ve water content of the raisins, were not made until 
January, 1945. Oral evidence is, ad:aililsible to show the mean-
ing of a term in a particular trade or business in order to 
enable the court to interpret the writing. This oral evidence 
is not received to vary or contradict the writing but to ex-
plain it. (ErmoZieff v. R~ K. O. Radio Pictur", 19 Cal.2d 
543 [122 P.2d 3]; Oalifornia C. P. Growe,., v. Williams, 11 
Cal.2d 221 [78 P.2d 1154]; Body-Steffne,. 00. v. Flotill 
Produof., 63 Cal.App.2d 555 [147 P.2d 84].) In the Ermolieff 
case this court said (p. 550): "The basis of this rule is that 
to accomplish a purpose of paramount importance in inter-
pretation of documents, namely, to ascertain the true intent 
of the parties, it may well be said that the usage evidence 
:loes not alter the contract of the parties, but on the contrary 
rives the effect to the words there used as intended by the 
)arties. The usagf' becomes a part of the contract in aid of 
ts correct interpretation." It iii apparent from the record 
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t hat all t hI' gro,,,ers han bc('n in the hURincss for many years, 
and wpre well aware of thc f}ld 1 hilt raisins properly cured 
and in good condition were raisins that would go through 
the' 'stemmer," a machine used preparatory to packing the 
fruit. That these raisins would uot go through the "stemmer" 
and were necessarily stacked inside and out of the packing 
house is, in itself, evidence that the raisins were not de· 
livered in accordance with the agreement. With reRpect to 
the raisins delivered by defendant J. H. Scheidt, there was 
testimony to the effeCt that he had admitted that his raisins 
were too "wet" and that he had got "more [money] than 
was coming to me" for them. Section 1870(2) of the Code of 
Civil Procedure provides that: "The act, declaration, or 
omission of a party" is evidence against such party. "The 
rule is settled beyond all controversy that the admissions or 
declarations of a party to a suit are admissible as evidence 
against the party making them. When given in evidence, 
they tend, as does other competent evidence, to prove the fact 
in issue to which they relate." (Hall v. Bark "Em~1y Ban-
ning," 33 Cal. 522, 524.) (Gates v. Pendleton, 71 Cal.App. 
752 [236 P. 365]; Langensand v. Obert, 129 Ca1.App. 214 
[18 P.2d 725].) 
The contention is made that the trial court restricted the 
defendants' right of cross-examination of one of plaintiffs' 
witnesses, and refused the admission of other evidence. The 
evidence sought to be introduced in the cross-examination 
was with respect to the custom of packing houses, other 
than the one here under consideration, of stacking the boxes 
of raisins until they were sufficiently dried out to run through 
the "stemmer." The objection was made and sustained that 
this custom was immaterial I to the issue involved-whether 
these particular raisins were delivered in conformity with 
the provisions of the marketing agreement. The excluded 
evidence consisted of a reiteration of testimony given before 
the arbitrators as to the condition of the raisins of one of 
the other growers. The trial court ruled that this had been 
concluded by the report of the arbitrators. But conceding, 
witbout deciding that this was not a proper ground for such 
ruling, it seems clear that the custom of other packing houses 
could not have been material to the present case since the 
issue at hand was whether or not the defendants had breached 
their agreement with the association. While facts concerning 
conditions at places other than those concerned in the case 
on trial may be admissible in evidence as bearing upon the 
) 
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issues of a case, in order to render such evidence admis&ible 
it must be shown that such conditions are substantially the 
same as that concerned in the instant case. There was no 
showing here nor offer to show that the other packing houses 
were similar with respect to lack of drying facilities, or that 
the marketing agreements were the same. 
The defendants maintain that even if the raisins were not 
delivered in conformity with the contract they were accepted 
by the association, and that as a result the provision with 
respect to the quality of the raisins was waived. The rec-
ord shows that as the defective raisins were brought in 
by the growers, Chris H. Scheidt complained that they were 
too wet to pack, and reported their condition to the secretary. 
manager, and the president of the association who, in tarn, 
reported to the board of directors. Chris H. Scheidt had DO 
authority to do more than report the derelictions to the 
directors. He was under no obligation to reject the raisins 
delivered by the members. Under his contract with thE' as-
sociation he was bound only to pack the raisins as they were 
delivered to him by the growers. His acceptance of the cte-
fective raisins could not have bound the association. Ilnrl 
cannot be considered a waiver on its part to the terms of the 
marketing agreement. 
Three of the five directors of the association were among 
those members who delivered the defective raisins to the 
association. When notice was given of the defective quality of 
the raisins and of the resultant breach of the marketing agree-
ment, it became their duty to enforce the terms of the contract. 
By not doing so, they obtained an advantage for themselves 
and the other defaulting members of the association. Directors 
of a cooperative hold the property and property rights of the 
members thereof as trustees. (BogardU8 v. Santa AM W. G. 
Ass'n., 41 Cal.App.2d 939 [108 P.2d 52] ; San Joaquin V. P. 
Producers' Ass '11.. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 136 F.2d 
382, 385; Texas Certified Cottonseed Breeders' Ass '11.. v. Al-
dridge, 122 Tex. 464 [61 S.W.2d 79] ; Bowles v. Inland Empire 
Da1'ry Ass'n., 53 F.Supp. 210, 214, 215.) The directors, know-
ing of their own defective deliveries, and the deliveries of 
the other defaulting members were bound to compel compliance 
with the marketing agreements and to pay damages themselves 
and to enforce the liquidated damage provisions of the agree-
ment. Further, by the terms of the by-laws they were required 
to withhold payments to any member indebted to the associa-
tion, SO that the lien of the association on monies due it by 
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a member would be safeguarded. In not so doing, they \ver£' 
guilty of a breach of trust with respect to the association and 
the other members. As such trustees, they were bound to act 
with t he utmost good faith. (Churchill v. Peters, 57 Cal.App. 
2d 321 (134 P.2d 841] ; Estate of Brown. 22 Cal.App.2d 480 
[71 P.2d 345] ; Overell v. Overell, 78 Cal.App. 251 [248 P. 
310].) 
The trial court correctly found that it was not necessary 
that plaintiffs make a demand on the directors that the term~ 
of the marketing' agreement be enforced because such demand 
would have been futile as three of the five directors werc 
among the defaulting members. The law does not require the 
doing of a futile act. (Smith v. Dorn, 96 Cal. 73 [30 P. 1024] ; 
Koshaba v. Koshaba, 56 Cal.App.2d 302 [132 P.2d 854] ; 6A 
Cal.Jur. 810-812, and cases there cited.) In Smith v. Dm'n. 
supra, page 79, the court said; "Besides, the answer of the 
corporation shows that any demand upon it or upon its 
controlling directors for the remedy sought by this action, or 
any remedy for the wrongs alleged, would have been useless. 
Therefore, no such demand was necessary." (Ashton v. Dash-
away Association, 84 Cal. 61 [22 P. 660,23 P. 1091, 7 L.R.A. 
809] ; Moyle v. Lander's Adm'rs., 83 Cal. 579 [23 P. 798] ; 
Parrott v. Byers, 40 Cal. 614.) 
The point is made by the defendants that one of the 
plaintiffs, Chris H. Seheidt, does not come into equity with 
"clean hands" in that he refused to let the defaulting grow-
ers retake their raisins for further drying, and that it was his 
duty to do so in order to mitigate damages. An examination 
of the record shows that the evidence was conflicting as to 
whether the growers tried to retake the raisins for further 
drying, and with respect to whether they intended to return 
them to Chris H. Scheidt for packing thereafter. It was the 
province of the trial court to resolve this conflict, and it is to 
be presumed that the trial judge reconciled and accounted for, 
to his own satisfaction, any and all inconsistencies which 
might be made to appear in the testimony. 
There is no merit in defendants' contention that the judg-
ment for attorneys' fees and the appointment of a receiver 
was erroneous. "It is a well-established doctrine of equity 
jurisprudence that where a common fund exists to which a 
number of persons are entitled and in their interest successful 
litigation is maintained for its preservation and protection, 
an allowance of counsel fees may properly be made from such 
fund. By this means all of the beneficiaries of the fund pay 
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their share of the expl'll~ ncet'ssary to IIlllkf' it llyailabl.· to 
them." (Emphasi~ added.) (Willslow v. Harold G. Fergu· 
son Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 274, 27'[ 1153 P.2d 714j.) And a court of 
equity has inht'rent power to appoint a receiver at the request 
of stockholders on grounds of fraud or mismanagement. 
(Koshaba v. Koshaba, supra.) 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment. 
TRAYNOR, J., and SCHAUER, J.-We concur in the 
conclusion reached by Justice Carter and generally in the 
grounds stated therefor. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied A pril21. 
1949. Carter, J., Traynor, J!, and Schauer, J., voted for a 
rehearing. 
